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Information is increasingly being viewed as a resource used by organisms to increase their fitness.
Indeed, it has been formally shown that there is a sensible way to assign a reproductive value to
information and it is non-negative. However, all of this work assumed that information collection is
cost-free. Here, we account for such a cost and provide conditions for when the reproductive value
of information will be negative. In these instances, counter-intuitively, it is in the interest of the
organism to remain ignorant. We link our results to empirical studies where Bayesian behaviour
appears to break down in complex environments and provide an alternative explanation of lowered
arousal thresholds in the evolution of sleep.
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In all areas of biology observations or cues can elicit
a change in behaviour or phenotype. For example, the
duration of daylight hours affects the flowering time of
plants [2], chemotactic gradients provide a way for bacte-
ria to locate favourable environments [1] and the sighting
of a predator may cause an animal to flee. In each case,
the observation aids in the choice of an action that will
benefit the organism. In this way, if there is no cost in col-
lecting information then organisms should always collect
it. Indeed, borrowing from economic theory, but replac-
ing utilities with reproductive values, it has been shown
that the reproductive value of information is always non-
negative [14, 17]. This remarkable result suggests that
organisms can never decrease their fitness by being more
informed. This has far reaching implications in areas of
biology as diverse as public goods games, foraging, col-
lective behaviour and sleep. However, in reality, informa-
tion comes at a cost [10]. In this paper, we investigate
the consequences of formally including such costs in the
current theoretical framework. While information may
be inherently valuable in decision making, we challenge
the view that it always should be or indeed is collected.
In the context of organismal biology, information use
has been approached from two very distinct angles. The
first employs the information theory pioneered by Shan-
non and Weaver [20]. The alternative, which we take,
makes use of statistical decision theory [5, 13, 15]. The
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former focuses on uncertainty reduction whereas the lat-
ter considers how information updating, via Bayes rule,
explicitly affects fitnesses. Only recently was the connec-
tion between these two approaches shown. Strikingly,
mutual information (an information-theoretic measure
which quantifies the uncertainty of an outcome after an
observation) provides an upper bound on the value of
information (a decision-theoretic measure expressed ex-
plicitly in terms of fitnesses) [6]. However, this is only
the case when the fitness measure used is long-term lin-
eage growth rate. Here, we use individual reproductive
values. In this way, the value of information is defined
by taking the difference in expected optimal reproduc-
tive values before and after collecting information. The
literature on information use in biology is vast so we do
not try to cover it here. However, for useful reviews see
[5, 18, 19, 22]
We start by adopting the same framework as in [14].
Following this, we derive conditions, in the absence of a
cost, for when the reproductive value of information is
precisely equal to zero. In this case, an organism that
collects information will be no better off than one that
does not. Next, we account for a cost of collecting infor-
mation. We do this by discounting the previous repro-
ductive values associated with certain actions and beliefs
prior to information collection. This way, the cost is due
solely to the collection of information itself. In the pro-
ceeding section, we show that the same conditions that
we derived previously now lead to the reproductive value
of information being negative. In this instance, an or-
ganism that remains ignorant will have a higher fitness
than one that does not. This has implications for many
empirical studies whereby, in increasingly complex en-
vironments, organisms were found to stop behaving in a
Bayesian manner [9]. It may be that the cost of collection
2in these complex environments outweighs any benefits.
Additionally, we consider the ramifications for evolution-
ary problems such as the evolution of sleep. In particular,
we suggest that the lowered arousal thresholds associated
with sleep, often explained as the by-product of other vi-
tal functions, may instead be accounted for by our results
[11]. We finish by summarising our findings and suggest-
ing future directions of work relating ignorance at the
level of the individual to behaviour at the level of the
group [4].
RESULTS
Framework
Following [14], we start by assuming there are n pos-
sible true states of nature, collected in the vector Θ =
(θ1, .., θn), about which a given organism is unsure. This
organism believes, with probability pi, that θi is the true
state. In this way the vector P = (p1, ..., pn) summarises
the organism’s (imperfect) knowledge of nature.
Further, we assume that this organism must take a cer-
tain action, given its beliefs, which will affect its fitness.
In particular, a certain action u will have reproductive
value Vi(u) given the true state of nature is θi. With this
set-up, we find the expected reproductive value of action
u to be given by
V (u, P ) =
n∑
i=1
piVi(u). (1)
Then for any vector P , we define the optimal action u∗
so that
V (u, P ) ≤ V (u∗, P ), (2)
for any action u.
We now suppose that this organism can gather infor-
mation thereby updating its knowledge. We assume it
does this by sampling a random variable X which de-
pends on Θ. We denote the probability the observed
value of X is x given θi by f(x|θi). With this, we can
interpret pi to be a prior probability and use the obser-
vation to form its posterior using Bayes rule, which we
denote by qi(x). Doing so gives
qi(x) =
pif(x|θi)∑n
j=1 pjf(x|θj)
. (3)
With this extra information, the organism’s knowledge is
now summarised by Q(X) = (q1, ..., qn).
With this set-up we define the expected reproductive
value (taken over observations X) of information I such
that [14]:
I = E[V (u˜(X), Q(X))]− V (u∗, P ) . (4)
The first term of this quantity is the reproductive value
after collecting information, optimised over actions, and
averaged over observations. The second term is the opti-
mal reproductive value if information is not collected. In
this way, the difference quantifies the benefit of collecting
information.
Expected value of information is non-negative
While inequality (2) is expressed in terms of P it is
also true for the random vector Q(X). In particular,
V (u,Q(X)) ≤ V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X)). (5)
Taking the expected value with respect to X we then
have that
E[V (u,Q(X))] ≤ E[V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))]. (6)
The left hand side of inequality (6) can be rewritten as
E[V (u,Q(X))] = E[
n∑
i=1
qi(X)Vi(u)] (7)
=
n∑
i=1
E[qi(X)Vi(u)] (8)
=
n∑
i=1
E[qi(X)]Vi(u) (9)
However, as the expectation is taken over observations x,
we have
E[qi(X)] =
∑
x
qi(x)f(x) (10)
where f(x) is the probability that the observed value of
X is x. Using the law of total probability, f(x) can in
fact be written as
f(x) =
n∑
j=1
pjf(x|θj), (11)
so that, coupled with (3), (10) can be reexpressed as
E[qi(X)] = pi
∑
x
f(x|θj), (12)
= pi, (13)
as f(x|θj) is a probability distribution.
Now, using (13) in (9) we find that
E[V (u,Q(X))] =
n∑
i=1
piVi(u) (14)
= V (u, P ), (15)
by (1). This statement is true for any action u so that
it is in particular true of the action u∗(P ) that optimises
V (u, P ).
Finally, using (15) in inequality (6) and rearranging we
find that
0 ≤ E[V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))]− V (u∗, P ). (16)
Otherwise put, the expected reproductive value of infor-
mation I is non-negative.
3When is the expected value of information equal to
zero?
So far we have shown (and also in [14]) that the ex-
pected value of information is non-negative. However, if
it is equal to zero then an organism that collects infor-
mation will be no better off than an organism that does.
To investigate this, we start by bounding inequality
(6) from above. Similarly to equations (7) and (8) but
for the right hand side of (6) we have
E[V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] = E[
n∑
i=1
qi(X)Vi(u˜(X)] (17)
=
n∑
i=1
E[qi(X)Vi(u˜(X))]. (18)
However this time as the action u(X) taken depends on
the observation we must take the expectation directly. In
particular, we have
E[V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] =
n∑
i=1
∑
x
qi(x)Vi(u˜(x))f(x).
(19)
We now suppose that there exists some xˆ such that
n∑
i=1
∑
x
qi(x)Vi(u˜(x))f(x) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
x
qi(x)Vi(u˜(xˆ))f(x)
(20)
Using (3), this then becomes
n∑
i=1
∑
x
qi(x)Vi(u˜(x))f(x) ≤
n∑
i=1
piVi(u˜(xˆ))
∑
x
f(x|θi)
(21)
= V (u˜(xˆ), P ), (22)
as f(x|θi) is a probability distribution. Hence, if such an
xˆ does exist, we have showed that
V (u∗, P ) ≤ E[V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] ≤ V (u˜(xˆ), P ). (23)
However, from the very definition of u∗ it must be that
V (u˜(xˆ), P ) ≤ V (u∗, P ), (24)
so that in fact
E[V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] = V (u∗, P ), (25)
and so
I = 0. (26)
For such an xˆ to exist we need, from (20), that
∑
x
qi(x)Vi(u˜(x))f(x) ≤
∑
x
qi(x)Vi(u˜(xˆ))f(x), (27)
for each i. Using (3) this is equivalent to requiring
∑
x
f(x|θi)Vi(u˜(x)) ≤ Vi(u˜(xˆ))
∑
x
f(x|θi) (28)
= Vi(u˜(xˆ)), (29)
which is in turn equivalent to
f(xˆ|θi)Vi(u˜(xˆ)) +
∑
x 6=xˆ
f(x|θi)Vi(u˜(x)) ≤ Vi(u˜(xˆ)). (30)
This statement will clearly be true in three cases. Either
Vi(u˜(x)) = 0, (31)
for each x 6= xˆ and for each i or
f(x|θi) = 0, (32)
for each x 6= xˆ and for each i or, finally, a mixture of
these two previous extreme cases. In particular, we can
have instances where there is a particular x 6= xˆ so that
Vi(u˜(x)) 6= 0, f(x|θi) = 0, (33)
for each i or vice versa so that
Vi(u˜(x)) = 0, f(x|θi) 6= 0, (34)
for each i.
Condition (31) asserts that all other possible actions
will have a reproductive value of zero. Though unlikely,
this may be realised if presented with an extreme situa-
tion (such as certain death in the face of predation) when
only one action will lead to survival.
Alternatively, via (11) condition (32) implies
f(xˆ) = 1. (35)
The interpretation here is that only the observation xˆ
will be observed. In this way, this condition says some-
thing about the environment in which an organism finds
itself. If the organism finds itself in a period of relative
constancy (such as certain safety due to a temporary lack
of predators), this condition will be fulfilled.
The blended conditions (33) and (34) represent the
more realistic situations where there is still flexibility in
actions with nonzero reproductive value but the observa-
tion to which it corresponds will not be observed or where
an observation will have nonzero probability of being ob-
served but the associated reproductive value is zero, re-
spectively. Otherwise put, an organism may be adapted
and able to respond to a certain cue however currently is
in a situation where that cue will not be observed. Al-
ternatively, the organism may observe a certain cue but
is unable to adequately respond.
Accounting for a cost of information collection
We now assume that the collection of information
comes at a cost c. The reproductive value associated
4with any given action u taken after gathering informa-
tion will then be discounted by this cost. Hence, if an
organism collects information the reproductive value of
action u given state θi will be
V¯i(u) = Vi(u)− c. (36)
As before, we have that
E[V¯ (u,Q(X))] ≤ E[V¯ (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))], (37)
for any u. Replacing Vi(u) with V¯i(u) in (9), the left
hand side of this inequality can be written as
E[V¯ (u,Q(X))] = V (u, P )− c, (38)
which is, in particular, true for u∗ so that we have
V (u∗, P )− c ≤ E[V¯ (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] (39)
Similarly, replacing occurrences of Vi(·) with V¯i(·) in the
entire preceding section it follows that
E[V¯ (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] ≤ V (u∗, P )− c, (40)
so that, if there is a cost to collecting information we find
that
E[V¯ (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))] = V (u∗, P )− c. (41)
Hence
I = −c. (42)
This result, as before, relies on one of the four conditions
(31)-(34) being true. In this case, an organism that col-
lects information will be worse off than an organism that
does not.
Alternative measures for valuing information
With some important recent exceptions, it is not gen-
erally believed that organisms are behaving in a strictly
Bayesian manner [3, 9, 12]. Instead, it is suspected that
they follow Rules of Thumb that approximate optimal
Bayesian strategies [13, 15]. These rules are based on ei-
ther the experience of an organism’s ancestors (and so is
genetically encoded), the experience of the organism it-
self or a combination of both [7, 9, 15] . When these rules
are based on the experience of the organism they will be
informed by typical observations. In some circumstances,
the expected value (such as with the analysis performed
above) will be a good indication of typical sampled val-
ues.
However, in other cases the expected value is in fact a
very poor measure of typical values. To be more concrete,
consider G(X) defined such that
G(X) = V (u˜(Q(X)), Q(X))− V (u∗, P ) (43)
with probability density function g(x). Note that this
random variable has the property that E[G(X)] = I.
If g(x) is a unimodal symmetric distribution then I will
be a decent indication of typical values. However, if g(x)
is, say, multimodal or skewed then I will be a poor mea-
sure. Moreover, if g(x) is positively skewed then typical
values of G may be negative. In this case, even without
a cost associated with the act of information collection,
it will not be beneficial for an organism operating under
a Rule of Thumb to collect information.
Whether or not g(x) is skewed will depend on f(x), the
distribution describing X . However, the random variable
X describes the environment the organism is in. For this
reason, it is highly plausible that X and so g(x) will
change as a function of time. For example, it may be
that predators are more prevalent at a certain time over
the course of one day. In this case, the probability of
observing a predator will also change over that period.
So too, then, will g(x).
DISCUSSION
The notion of putting a value on information has ex-
isted in economic theory for quite some time [8]. Despite
this, analogous work in the context of animal behaviour
has taken a little longer to catch up. Recently, however,
it was formally shown that the reproductive value of in-
formation is always non-negative when there is no cost
in its collection [14]. From this, it has been concluded
that organisms should always collect information. This
conclusion has since not been investigated much further
in the literature. While costs associated with sampling
have been considered in some evolutionary games (see
[16], where the costs are crucial to maintain a mix of
strategies), the focus has not been on the whether or not
information should be collected in the first place.
Here, using the same framework, we derived particu-
lar conditions for when the value of information will be
equal to zero. In such a case, an organism that collects
information will in fact be no better off than one that
does not. Following this, we explicitly accounted for a
cost of collecting information. In reality, this may come
in the form of energy, time or resources that could other-
wise be spent on other vital biological functions [10]. In
this instance, we found that under the same conditions
as before, the value of information will now be negative.
Thus, there will be times when the collection of informa-
tion will have a negative impact on an organism’s fitness.
These conditions can be broadly organised into three
groups. First, if an organism finds itself (potentially tem-
porarily) in a situation whereby only one action will lead
to a non-zero reproductive value, then the value of in-
formation will be negative. Second, if it is such that
only one observation will be observed (again, potentially
temporarily), then an organism will not benefit from col-
lecting information. Both of these cases, in the absence
of a cost of collecting information, are emphasised infor-
5mally in [17]. The third, a mixture of the previous two
conditions, is not. In this case, an organism can still
be flexible in its actions, and there can still be variance
in observations, and yet the value of information will be
less than zero. To be more concrete, this third condition
will be fulfilled if an organism may observe a certain cue
but is unable to adequately respond or if it is adapted
and able to respond to a certain cue however currently
is in a situation where it will not be observed. In either
case, an organism will do better if they remain relatively
ignorant.
Though the results presented here are quite broad
they, and in particular the last condition, have strong
implications for the evolution of sleep and sleep-like
states. Broadly speaking, sleep can be defined physi-
ologically (characterised by certain brain activities) or
behaviourally (characterised by inactivity and arousal
thresholds). Some organisms, like dolphins, sleep accord-
ing to one definition but not the other [21]. It is however
the behavioural definition, and in particular the lowered
arousal thresholds, that presents the evolutionary puz-
zle. This vulnerable disconnect from an organism’s en-
vironment is most often explained by assuming a priori
that sleep serves some vital function for which this be-
havioural shutdown is necessary [11]. Here, however, we
have shown that such an assumption is not necessary. If
there is a cost to collecting information, then there will
be times when it should not be collected. We are not,
of course, suggesting that vital functions of sleep do not
exist. However, our result opens up the possibility that
the vital functions evolved after behavioural shutdowns
and not the other way around.
In an empirical review of animal Bayesian updating, it
was found that in simple environments all but one species
performed consistently with Bayesian predictions [9]. In
complex environments, this was not found to be true.
The explanation put forward was that in these complex
environments it is more difficult, or takes longer, for the
organism in question to successfully learn prior distribu-
tions. An alternative and complementary explanation,
suggested by our results, is that the cost of collecting
information may be too high in these environments. In
other words, they are making a Bayesian decision to re-
main ignorant. It would be exceedingly interesting to
test this hypothesis experimentally.
More generally, we have shown that periods of igno-
rance can lead to fitness benefits at the level of the in-
dividual. For future theoretical work, it would be fruit-
ful to understand how this may translate to behaviour
at the level of the group. Recently, it has been shown
how uninformed individuals can help democratic consen-
sus be reached in the face of internal conflicts [4]. This
particular study however makes no reference to individ-
ual fitnesses but is, in essence, mechanistic. It would be
particularly interesting to see if, taking an evolutionary
approach, similar conclusions can be found.
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